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SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY
NOTIFICATION LAWS: WILL THESE LAWS SURVIVE?
I. INTRODUCTION
While the 1990s witnessed the emergence of sex offender regis-
tration and community notification laws nationwide,1 the consti-
tutionality of such laws is still being challenged today. Sex of-
fender registration and community notification laws have
received both positive and negative reactions. Opponents argue
that the laws violate substantive and procedural due process, pri-
vacy rights, and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution2 be-
cause sex offenders bear a lifetime of stigmatization as a result of
the laws.' However, proponents of the laws argue sex offenders
should not be entitled to live a new life while the victim's family
suffers from a lifetime of emotional trauma as a result of the sex-
ual offense perpetrated against them.4 Today all fifty states and
the District of Columbia have sex offender registration and com-
munity notification laws,5 and thirty-two states make their regis-
tries available on the Internet.6
This Comment examines sex offender registration and commu-
nity notification laws. Part II examines the development of state
and federal sex offender registration and community notification
laws. Part III discusses the purpose of sex offender classification
1. See Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law: Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Pro-
cedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1172 (1999).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed."); Id. § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or
law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility.").
3. See Robert R. Hindman, Note, Megan's Law and Its Progeny: Whom Will the
Courts Protect?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 201, 218 (1997) (citing Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691,
701 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
4. Id. at 202.
5. Logan, supra note 1, at 1172.
6. KlaasKids Foundation, Megan's Law in All 50 States, at
http://www.meganslaw.org (last updated Feb. 7, 2003).
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and the methods states use to classify sex offenders. Part IV ana-
lyzes the purposes and goals of sex offender registration and
community notification laws. Part V considers the constitutional
challenges to sex offender registration and community notifica-
tion laws. In addition, Part V provides a description of Connecti-
cut Department of Public Safety v. Doe7 and Smith v. Doe,' two
cases recently decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States, which challenged the constitutionality of sex offender reg-
istration and community notification laws. Connecticut Depart-
ment of Public Safety challenged Connecticut's sex offender regis-
try laws as a violation of the procedural due process rights of sex
offenders under the Fourteenth Amendment,9 and Smith chal-
lenged Alaska's sex offender registry law as a violation of the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.1" Part VI analyzes the Su-
preme Court's decisions in Connecticut Department of Public
Safety and Smith and discusses the impact of both decisions on
sex offender registration and community notification laws. Part
VII offers insight into the future of sex offender registration and
community notification laws.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL AND STATE SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS
In response to the kidnap and murder of seven-year-old Megan
Kanka, the New Jersey legislature passed sex offender registra-
tion legislation, which spawned a nationwide movement for the
development of sex offender registries. 1 Although California was
the first to enact sex offender registry legislation,'2 the passage of
sex offender registration laws in New Jersey, now popularly
called Megan's Laws, spurred the passage of similar measures
nationwide.13
7. 123 S. Ct. 1140 (2003).
8. 123 S. Ct. 1160 (2003).
9. Brief for Respondents at i, 16-19, Conn. Dep't of Public Safety v. Doe, 123 S. Ct.
1160 (2003) (No. 01-1231) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
10. Brief for Petitioners at i, 15-18, Smith v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1140 (2003) (No. 01-729)
(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; art. I, § 10, cl. 1).
11. Logan, supra note 1, at 1172; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -19 (West 1995
& Supp. 2002).
12. Logan, supra note 1, at 1172 n.25 (noting that California enacted the first registry
laws in 1947).
13. Logan, supra note 1, at 1172. Washington was the first state to enact sex offender
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While some states took the initiative to enact sex offender reg-
istries in the early 1990s, 4 most states passed sex offender regis-
tration legislation in response to the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act
("Jacob Wetterling Act"), which Congress enacted in 1994.15 The
Jacob Wetterling Act mandates that states pass legislation creat-
ing a sex offender registration database to be shared with the FBI
and local law enforcement agencies, government agencies con-
ducting confidential background checks, and the public if "neces-
sary to protect the public concerning a specific person required to
register."16 States risk losing ten percent of their federal law en-
forcement block grants and having their funds reallocated to
compliant states if they fail to comply with the Jacob Wetterling
Act.17 As a result, states hastened to pass legislation in compli-
ance with the Jacob Wetterling Act, which allows information to
be released to a member of the public without a law enforcement
agency assessing the need for disclosure and without assessing
the privacy rights or concerns of the sex offender.1"
Federal legislation regulating and mandating the creation of
sex offender registration and community notification systems fur-
ther expanded in 1996 with the passage of the federal Megan's
Law.19 This legislation provides that information collected in the
registry system may be disclosed to members of the public in
compliance with state law.2° The legislation also permits law en-
forcement authorities to release information needed to protect
public safety.2' Local law enforcement authorities no longer have
community notification laws. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130 (Supp. 2003); Alan R. Ka-
bat, Note, Scarlet Letter Sex Offender Databases and Community Notification: Sacrificing
Personal Privacy for a Symbol's Sake, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 333, 334-35 (1998).
14. See Logan, supra note 1, at 1170-73.
15. See Kabat, supra note 13, at 348; Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e).
17. See id. § 14071(g)(2); see also id. § 14071(e); Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetter-
ling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, as
Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 572, 585 (Jan. 5, 1999) [hereinafter Final Guidelines] (requiring
states to comply with the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act by November 25, 2000 to avoid losing Byrne Formula Grant
funding, but a two-year extension could be granted).
18. See Kabat, supra note 13, at 348-49.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e) (2000).
20. Id. § 14071(e)(1).
21. Id. § 14071(e)(2).
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discretion in releasing the information because they must release
the information if the information is necessary to protect public
safety.22
Congress also enacted the Pam Lyncher Sexual Offender
Tracking and Identification Act of 1996 ("Pam Lyncher Act") cre-
ating a FBI database for all persons that have committed sexual
crimes against minors and providing authority for both the FBI
and state law enforcement authorities to provide community noti-
fication.23 The database allows authorities to monitor the move-
ment of sex offenders, especially sex offenders who move from
state to state, and promotes the exchange between states of in-
formation regarding sex offenders and sex crimes.24 Furthermore,
the Pam Lyncher Act mandates that persons with two or more
prior convictions for a registration-eligible offense and any person
guilty of an "aggravated" sexual offense remain registered
throughout his lifetime. An aggravated offense includes sex
crimes involving penetration through the use or threat of force
and sexual acts with a person under the age of twelve.26
Finally, Congress heightened the registration requirements for
"sexually violent predators" in 1998.27 A "sexually violent preda-
tor" is a "person who has been convicted of a sexually violent of-
fense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder that makes the person likely to engage in predatory
sexually violent offenses."2 Under this legislation, states must
prescribe and implement methods of identifying "sexually violent
predators" and determine when the assessment should be made.29
Federal law dictates that a court make the determination after
considering the recommendation of a board comprised of "experts
in the behavior and treatment of sex offenders, victims' rights ad-
vocates, and representatives of law enforcement agencies.""
However, the Attorney General may either waive (1) the above
22. Id. § 14071(e)(2); Kabat, supra note 13, at 349.
23. Pam Lyncher Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §
14072 (2000).
24. See id. § 14072(b), (g); see also Kabat, supra note 13, at 349.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 14072(d)(2).
26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2246 (2000).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(i) (2000).
28. Id. § 14071(a)(3)(C).
29. Id. § 14071(a)(2)(A)-(B).
30. Id. § 14071(a)(2)(A).
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requirements if a state develops appropriate methods and stan-
dards for identifying "sexually violent predators"; or (2) "approve
alternative measures of comparable or greater effectiveness in
protecting the public from unusually dangerous or recidivistic
sexual offenders."31 Thus, a state may designate the responsibility
to a parole board or an administrative agency to avoid involving
the judiciary in the assessment. 32 Not only must sexually violent
predators register throughout their lifetime, but they must also
provide their name, "identifying factors, anticipated future resi-
dence, offense history, and documentation of any treatment re-
ceived for [their] mental abnormality or personality disorder."33 In
addition, sexually violent predators must verify their registry in-
formation four times a year.
34
Under current federal law and pursuant to the Jacob Wetter-
ling Act, all persons convicted of a crime against a minor or con-
victed of a "sexually violent offense" are required to register.35 A
person, other than a parent, convicted of child kidnapping or false
imprisonment of a child must register, as well as a person con-
victed of sexual offenses, including attempts, against minors.36 A
"sexually violent offense" includes both aggravated and non-
aggravated sexual abuse as defined under federal law.37 Registry
information must include, at a minimum, the sex offender's
name, current address, fingerprints, and photograph.38 Further-
more, eligible sex offenders must remain registered for a mini-
mum of ten years unless a pardon is granted or their conviction is
reversed, vacated, or set aside.39
The federal statutory provisions provide states with "a mini-
mum baseline for registration, database maintenance, and com-
munity notification" systems.4 ° Thus, individual state laws re-
garding registration, database maintenance, and community
31. Id. § 14071(a)(2)(B)-(C).
32. Final Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 572, 583 (Jan. 5, 1999).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(1)(B).
34. Id. § 14071(b)(3)(B).
35. Id. § 14071(a)(1)(A).
36. Id. § 14071(a)(3)(A)(i)-(viii).
37. Id. § 14071(a)(3)(B).
38. Id. § 14071(b)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv). In addition, states may require sex offenders to sub-
mit current employment information and samples of DNA. Final Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg.
572, 579 (Jan. 5, 1999).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(6)(A).
40. Kabat, supra note 13, at 349.
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notification vary widely because individual states may choose
which sex offenders must register, what information sex offenders
must provide, what information must be disclosed, and what
standards and procedures to use to determine which sex offenders
must register.41
III. THE METHODS OF SEX OFFENDER CLASSIFICATION
Since states have a wide degree of latitude in the development
and implementation of sex offender registration and community
notification laws, they use various methods to classify and iden-
tify sex offenders for the purpose of community notification.2
Compulsory and discretionary notification are the two methods
primarily used by states to classify sex offenders.4 ' Nineteen
states use the compulsory method of classification, which requires
sex offenders convicted of child or sex crimes enumerated in state
law to register and submit to community notification. 44 The com-
pulsory system requires community notification regardless of the
risk of recidivism.4" States, like Alaska, justify the use of the
compulsory system as a means to collect and provide information
on sex offenders without the adjudication or evaluation of indi-
vidual sex offenders.46 Alaska's legislature believes the conviction
of a sex crime provides an adequate basis for including every sex
offender in the state's registry because a risk of recidivism always
exists."
The discretionary system is used by the remaining thirty-one
states and the District of Columbia.48 Under the discretionary
system, a state uses a case-by-case analysis to determine whether
a sex offender is required to register and submit to community
41. See Final Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. at 582; Logan, supra note 1, at 1174.
42. See Final Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. at 582; Wayne A. Logan, A Study in "Actuarial
Justices": Sex Offender Classification Practice and Procedure, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 593,
599 (2000).
43. Logan, supra note 42, at 602-03.
44. Id. at 603.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 605-06 (citing Patterson v. State, 985 P.2d 1007, 1017 (Alaska Ct. App.
1999)).
47. Id. at 605.
48. Id. at 606.
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notification laws.49 The risk of an individual's recidivism is used
to determine what, if any, information should be released to the
public. ° Standard criteria are utilized at a hearing before a court
or board to determine the length, method, and appropriate means
of community notification.51 Under the discretionary system, a
sex offender with a low risk of recidivism may only be subject to
law enforcement notification; however, community organizations
may be notified of the risk particular sex offenders pose, and the
entire community may be notified of extremely high risk sex of-
fenders.2 Unlike the compulsory system, sex offenders are given
notice and an opportunity to be heard under the discretionary
system.53
IV. THE PURPOSE AND GOALS OF SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS
Many policy reasons are provided to justify the enactment of
sex offender registration and community notification laws; the
protection of public safety is a predominant justification for the
laws.54 Preventing and controlling crime is important to the
American public, especially preventing crimes against children.5
Political candidates and legislators have campaigned and worked
to pass sex offender registration and community notification laws
in order to bring the importance of preventing sex crimes to the
attention of the American public, thereby gaining support of con-
stituents who view sex offenders as outcasts of society. 6 Sex of-
fender registration and community notification laws serve as a
means of balancing and addressing public concern in a manner
that is most beneficial to the public and the least burdensome to
sex offenders.5
49. Id. at 598.
50. See id.; see also Final Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 572, 582 (Jan. 5, 1999); Logan, su-
pra note 1, at 1175.
51. Logan, supra note 1, at 1175.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Carol L. Kunz, Comment, Toward Dispassionate, Effective Control of Sexual Of-
fenders, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 453, 471 (1997).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 475.
57. Id. at 471.
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Sex offender registration and community notification laws are
justified further due to the high rate of recidivism among sex of-
fenders.5" Proponents of the laws argue that once convicted sex
offenders come into contact with potential victims in their
neighborhood,, they will succumb to their previous behavior.59 As
a result, supporters of sex offender registration and community
notification laws believe the laws deter sex crimes." Not only do
supporters argue that sex offenders are less likely to commit an
offense if they know the community and law enforcement are
closely monitoring their activity, but they also believe that par-
ents are better able to protect their children once a potential risk
of harm has been identified.61 Furthermore, proponents believe
the laws provide the most effective means of preventing recidi-
vism because sexual deviance cannot be cured-even with treat-
ment programs.6 2 Finally, supporters argue that sex offender reg-
istration and community notification laws are the most
economical means of monitoring and preventing recidivism be-
cause life imprisonment is too expensive and not practical."
However, critics of notification laws argue that the laws create
a false sense of security because many sex crimes against chil-
dren are committed by a person the child knows. Furthermore,
only five to ten percent of all sex offenders are ever arrested and
convicted, meaning most sexual predators are never subject to
registration and community notification laws.64 Additionally, op-
ponents assert that if a sex offender knows which people in the
community are subject to notification, the sex offender will seek
to commit a subsequent offense outside of the geographic area
where he or she is subject to registration and community notifica-
tion laws.65 Since state notification requirements vary, sex of-
fenders can move to states with less stringent registration and
notification requirements, reducing the effectiveness of registra-
tion and community notification laws.66
58. Id.
59. Kabat, supra note 13, at 335.
60. Kunz, supra note 54, at 473.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 475.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 474.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS
Since the enactment of federal legislation, opponents have ini-
tiated constitutional challenges to sex offender registration and
community notification laws.67 While courts throughout the coun-
try have attempted to settle constitutional issues regarding sex
offender registration and community notification laws,68 new
challenges are still emerging and have yet to be resolved.
A. Substantive Due Process Claims and Privacy Rights
Substantive due process claims relying upon privacy rights
have not been successful, as public notification outweighs any in-
fringement on the substantive due process rights of sex offend-
ers.69 Substantive due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution requires states to enact legisla-
tion that is "fair and reasonable in content" and "further[s] a le-
gitimate governmental objective."7 The courts often reject sub-
stantive due process claims because sex offenders "have a
lessened expectation of privacy" as to the type of information
shared with the public under community notification laws even
though the information would be more difficult to ascertain with-
out notification statutes.71
While no per se constitutional right to privacy exists, privacy
has long been recognized by the Supreme Court as the "right to
be let alone"72 and an inherent right implied in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.73 Griswold v. Connecticut74 rec-
ognized that a right of privacy existed in marriage and in the
right to procreate." In the criminal context, the right to privacy
requires "first[,] that a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjec-
67. See infra text accompanying notes 69-75, 86-88, 113-27.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 78-85, 99-107.
69. Logan, supra note 1, at 1186-87.
70. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (7th ed. 1999).
71. See Logan, supra note 1, at 1187.
72. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
73. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (holding that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantees citizens personal liberty and privacy rights).
74. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
75. Id. at 485-86.
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tive) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' 76
However, the Supreme Court has not fully extended the right
of privacy to criminals.77 Applying the right of privacy to sex of-
fenders, privacy is the right to live and maintain anonymity in a
community without being subject to community notification
laws.7" In Doe v. Poritz,79 the New Jersey Supreme Court ana-
lyzed whether sex offenders have a "reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information disclosed."8 ° Here, the court noted that
the disclosure of one's age, name, previous convictions, automo-
bile description, pictures, and fingerprints did not infringe on a
sex offender's right of privacy.8' The court determined that a sex
offender does have a right of privacy with regard to the disclosure
of the address of his or her residence; however, New Jersey's in-
terest in protecting its citizenry outweighed any infringement on
a sex offender's privacy rights.8 2 Like the court 'in Poritz, the
Third Circuit determined that a sex offender's privacy rights are
not violated, even though the sex offender must disclose his or her
home address.8" Thus, in the eyes of state legislatures, the protec-
tion of public safety afforded by sex offender registration and
community notification laws outweighs any infringement on the
privacy rights of sex offenders.8 4 Not only have courts recognized
that certain information disclosed is not private, but some courts
also have held that sex offenders forfeit their privacy rights when
they commit a sex crime.8" Other courts have found that those sex
offenders who are dangerous and pose a threat to the public pos-
76. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
77. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (holding that the disclosure of the
names and photographs of unconvicted shoplifters did not violate any privacy right).
78. Kabat, supra note 13, at 337.
79. 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
80. Id. at 406.
81. Id. at 407-08.
82. Id. at 408-11.
83. Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that while a privacy
right exists in the information provided, the state and public interest in disclosing the in-
formation outweighs any infringement on a sex offender's privacy rights).
84. See, e.g., 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 41, § 1 ("the privacy interests of persons
convicted of sex offenses are less important than the government's interest in public
safety").
85. People v. Mills, 146 Cal. Rptr. 411, 417 (Ct. App. 1978) ("[A]ny person who com-
mits a violation.., has waived any right to privacy and may absolutely forfeit for a con-
siderable time-the term prescribed by law-his right to travel.").
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sess reduced privacy rights because any infringement on their
privacy must succumb to the need to protect the public's safety.86
B. Procedural Due Process
Encountering little success with substantive due process
claims, claimants have turned to procedural due process claims in
an attempt to overturn sex offender registration and community
notification laws. They argue that the laws fail to provide sex of-
fenders with adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard prior
to being required to comply with community notification require-
ments." Procedural due process, under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, requires a person
to be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before the per-
son is deprived of life, liberty, or a property interest.8 8 To have a
successful due process claim, sex offender registration and com-
munity notification laws must deprive the sex offender of a lib-
erty or property interest previously enjoyed under the law. 9
1. Reputation and Stigmatization
One issue raised by sex offender registration and community
notification laws in the procedural due process context involves
whether a liberty interest protects an individual from govern-
mental stigmatization.9" However, the extent of constitutional
protection afforded to a sex offender remains largely unan-
swered.91 The Supreme Court, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,92
addressed the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute that al-
lowed liquor stores to refuse to sell alcohol and to post the names
of people engaged in "excessive drinking" without affording them
notice and an opportunity to be heard.93 The Court ruled that
86. State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1070 (Wash. 1994) (holding that convicted sex of-
fenders have a reduced expectation of privacy if there is evidence that they pose a threat
to the public).
87. See discussion infra Part V.B.
88. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (7th ed. 1999).
89. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708 (1976).
90. Logan, supra note 1, at 1182.
91. Id. at 1182-83.
92. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
93. Id. at 434-35 (quoting Wis. STAT. § 176.26 (1967)).
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posting the names violated the individuals' due process rights be-
cause "where the State attaches 'a badge of infamy' to the citizen;
due process comes into play."9 4 However, the Court elevated the
requirements for a successful due process claim in Paul v.
Davis.95
In Paul v. Davis, the Supreme Court addressed whether the
disbursement of shoplifters' identifications, including names and
photographs, to eight hundred local businesses violated the due
process rights of the individuals labeled as shoplifters.96 The
Court held that damage to one's reputation alone does not impli-
cate any constitutional protection.97 The Court distinguished this
case from Constantineau because the Court felt in Constantineau
that the posting "deprived the individual of a right previously
held under state law-the right to purchase or obtain liquor...
with the rest of the citizenry."9 Subsequently, the:Paul test has
been deemed the "stigma plus" test and has been used by lower
courts to determine whether sex offender registration and com-
munity notification laws are constitutional.99
2. The Rejection of Procedural Due Process Claims
In Russell v. Gregoire,'00 the Ninth Circuit addressed the viola-
tion of due process in the context of sex offender registration and
community notification laws.1 °1 The Ninth Circuit upheld a Wash-
ington statute that required all sex offenders to provide their
name, address, date and place of birth, present employment,
criminal record, the location and date of each criminal offense, so-
cial security number, picture, and fingerprints. 112 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the claimants' due process rights were not violated
94. Id. at 437 (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952)).
95. 424 U.S. 693, 701-02 (1976).
96. Id. at 694-95.
97. Id. at 701 (holding that "reputation alone, apart from some more tangible inter-
ests" does not warrant constitutional protection).
98. Id. at 708.
99. See discussion infra Part V; Logan, supra note 1, at 1185.
100. 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997).
101. Id. at 1082 (examining a law that assessed each sex offender's risk of recidivism
before classifying the offender and determining the offender's notification requirements).
The law also permitted local law enforcement officials to release to the public the informa-
tion necessary to protect public safety. Id.
102. Id. at 1082, 1094.
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because the information disclosed to the public was not protected
unless it was personal information, like medical records. 10 3 The
court ruled that the information disclosed was already available
to the public through other means and not constitutionally pro-
tected except for the location of the claimants' residence and the
claimants' place of employment, but even this information was
not considered private. °4
The claimants also asserted that the Washington statute vio-
lated their procedural due process rights by infringing on a "lib-
erty interest" without affording them notice and an opportunity
to be heard.0 5 However, the court determined that the claimants
did not have a liberty interest at stake because the court had al-
ready denied their substantive due process claims. 06 Other courts
have followed the precedent established in Russell and held that
sex offender registration and community notification laws do not
infringe on the procedural due process rights of sex offenders."0 7
3. The Recognition of Procedural Due Process Claims
While many courts have refused to recognize substantive and
procedural due process claims, others have applied the Paul v.
Davis test and have been more willing to find a protected liberty
interest.08 Under Paul, reputation alone is not enough to succeed
103. Id. at 1094 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Lanni v. Engler, 994 F. Supp. 849, 855 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that for
a claimant to establish a procedural due process claim, the sex offender must prove that
the registration and community notification statute deprived him/her "of a protected lib-
erty or property interest" under the Fourteenth Amendment and that a hearing would
protect that interest). The court determined that Michigan's sex offender registration and
community notification laws did not infringe on the procedural due process rights of sex
offenders because the law merely "compiles truthful, public information and makes it more
readily available." Id. Furthermore, the court determined that "any detrimental effects
that may flow from the Act would flow most directly from plaintiffs own misconduct and
private citizen's reaction thereto, and only tangentially from state action." Id. The court
determined that a hearing would not protect the procedural due process rights of sex of-
fenders because all sex offenders were required to register and were subject to the public
disclosure of information without the benefit of police discretion to make an individualized
determination with regard to disclosing information. Id. See also Cutshall v. Sundquist,
193 F.3d 466, 478-81, 483 (6th Cir. 1999); People v. Logan, 705 N.E.2d 152, 160-61 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1998).
108. See discussion infra Part V; Logan, supra note 1, at 1192-93.
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on a procedural due process claim because to succeed on such a
claim the government must "alter 'a right or status previously
recognized by state law,' for it is that 'alteration, officially remov-
ing the interest from the recognition... previously afforded by
the State, which [the Court has] found sufficient to invoke the
procedural guarantees contained in the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."' 10 9
Courts applying the stigma plus test announced in Paul have
agreed that community notification laws negatively affect the
reputations of sex offenders.11 ° While sex offenders have already
suffered reputational harm when prosecuted and convicted of a
sex offense, the harm sustained from notification laws may cause
greater damage because the harm sustained is of a longer dura-
tion and involves the government deliberately labeling one as an
outcast to society."' In Doe v. Pryor,"2 the loss or foreclosure of
employment, as well as notification laws that present a threat to
future employment, have been found to violate procedural due
process.1 13 Furthermore, courts have ruled that registration and
notification requirements violate procedural due process because
they alter a legal status by imposing a penalty for failing to regis-
ter.
1 14
4. Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe"'
In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, the respon-
dents, in a class action lawsuit, argued that Connecticut's sex of-
fender registration and community notification laws violate pro-
cedural due process because any individual convicted of a sex
crime listed in the Connecticut statute must register, inform law
enforcement authorities of his or her name and current address,
and provide a picture. 6 As a result, the respondents believed
109. See W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1219 (D.N.J. 1996) (quoting Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976)).
110. Logan, supra note 1, at 1193.
111. Id. at 1193-94.
112. 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
113. See id. at 1232.
114. Doe v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38, 57 (2d Cir. 2001), rev'd, 123 S. Ct.
1160 (2003).
115. 123 S. Ct. 1160 (2003).
116. Id. at 1163. In addition, a person who has been found not guilty of a sex offense
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that the law infringes on their procedural due process rights un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment because it fails to identify only
the sex offenders that are truly dangerous to society.117 While
some sex crimes have more stringent registration and community
notification requirements, a sex offender falling under certain
statutory provisions may be exempt from registration and notifi-
cation requirements if a court determines the sex offender does
not pose a threat to public safety."'
The respondents challenged the Connecticut sex offender regis-
tration and community notification laws on procedural due proc-
ess grounds because they felt the registry stigmatizes all sex of-
fenders as a danger to public safety without making an individual
assessment as to the dangerousness of each sex offender."' The
respondents believed an accurate assessment of the dangerous-
ness of each sex offender could be made as Connecticut agencies
and boards make similar determinations when deciding to release
an individual on parole. 2 ° Furthermore, the respondents argued
that the broad language of the Connecticut sex offender registra-
tion and community notification statute encompasses a larger
category of sex offenders than the federal legislation envi-
sioned. 2' The respondents based this argument on the Jacob
Wetterling Act, which they argued does not require the personal
information of every sex offender to be distributed, and mandates
an individual assessment of the dangerousness of each sex of-
fender.'22
due to his or her mental disease must abide by Connecticut's registration requirements.
Brief for Respondents at 2 n.1, Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety (No. 01-1231).
117. See Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 123 S. Ct. at 1163-64.
118. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-251(b)-(c) (West 2001).
119. Brief for Respondents at 16-17, Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety (No. 01-1231). Since the
registry did not classify each sex offender's degree of danger to public safety, the respon-
dents argued that all sex offenders were unlawfully characterized as dangerous. Id. at 17.
The database combines individuals convicted of felonies, misdemeanors, and non-sex re-
lated crimes. Id. The statute and database also apply to persons receiving various prison
sentences, persons receiving treatment, and offenders acquitted due to mental disease or
illness. Id.
120. See id. at 18, 42 (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278-79 (1984)). Unlike
Connecticut, other states use discretionary classification systems and provide sex offend-
ers with notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 18.
121. See id. at 18.
122. Id.
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Citing Paul v. Davis,123 the respondents asserted their proce-
dural due process rights were violated; they claimed the statute
altered their legal rights and status because all sex offenders are
stigmatized by being labeled a danger to public safety.124 The le-
gal status of a sex offender is altered because all sex offenders are
subject to burdensome registration and notification requirements
from which other criminals and citizens are exempt.125 Further-
more, sex offenders receive a felony conviction for failing to com-
ply with the law and have no legal recourse against the state or
its officials for injuries caused by Connecticut's registration and
community notification laws. 26 The respondents asserted that
their procedural due process rights were violated because they
did not receive notice or an opportunity to be heard before the
"defamatory statements" were published in the registry. 127
The respondents presented a powerful case arguing that failing
to give a sex offender notice and an opportunity to be heard vio-
lates the purpose of the Connecticut statute, which is to protect
the public by informing them of the location of dangerous sex of-
fenders. 28
Instead of providing a tailored list of persons whom the State
has determined pose a danger to public safety, the State provides
a long list of names and faces about whom the public is told to
"beware." The overbroad category overloads the public by includ-
ing information about offenders who do not pose a danger,
thereby frustrating the purpose of the State's warning.
1 29
On March 5, 2003, the Supreme Court of the United States de-
cided the fate of sex offender registration and community notifi-
cation laws under the procedural due process claims of affected
parties. 3 °
123. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
124. See Brief for Respondents at 18, Conn. Dep't of Public Safety (No. 01-1231).
125. Id. at 33 (stating that the legal status of sex offenders is altered because sex of-
fenders must register, report their residential address, submit a picture, provide details of
their physical appearance for publication as a registered sex offender, and cannot sue
state officials, who are subject to immunity, for defamation or an invasion of privacy).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 18.
128. Id. at 49.
129. Id.
130. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1160 (2003). See discussion infra Part
VIA-B., which contains an analysis of the Court's decision and the impact of the decision
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C. Ex Post Facto Challenges and Smith v. Doe 131
Over the years, sex offender registration and community notifi-
cation laws have been challenged on the basis that they violate
the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.132 In order to pre-
vent passing an ex post facto law, a state legislature cannot enact
a law that punishes a citizen for an act that was lawful at the
time the citizen committed the act.
133
Like many other challenges to the constitutionality of sex of-
fender registration and community notification laws, the respon-
dents in Smith v. Doe sought to declare Alaska's sex offender reg-
istration and community notification statute unconstitutional. 34
Two convicted sex offenders challenged the statute on the basis
that it deprived them of pre-existing rights they enjoyed-under
the Alaska Constitution and state law.1 3' They claimed the laws
infringed upon their legal rights because they had a right to have
all their civil rights restored when they were unconditionally re-
leased from prison.1 36 In arguing that the statute constituted an
ex post facto law, the respondents based their argument upon the
right of privacy, the right to seek and obtain employment, and the
right to privacy free from government invasion in the home.
137
Under Alaska's law, the respondents are required to register as
on future constitutional challenges.
131. Smith v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1140 (2003).
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex
post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant Title of Nobility.").
133. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) ("[N]o man should be compelled
to do what the laws do not require; nor refrain from acts which the laws permit.").
134. Smith, 123 S. Ct. at 1146. The respondents asserted that the sex offender registra-
tion and community notification laws are ex post facto laws because they impose a duty on
sex offenders which requires them to submit their fingerprints, regularly report to au-
thorities for the rest of their lives, take an oath that the information provided is true, and
submit private information. Brief for Respondents at 28-29, Smith (No. 01-729). The re-
spondents argued the law intends to punish sex offenders and that their duty to register
arises solely because they have been convicted of a sex crime. Id. at 28. Thus, the respon-
dents believed the laws constituted ex post facto laws. Id. According to the respondents, ex
post facto laws encompass laws that subject an individual to compulsion. Id. at 29 (citing
Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Exchange Parts Co., 304 F.2d 368, 374 (5th Cir. 1962)).
135. Brief for Respondents at 2-3, Smith (No. 01-729).
136. Id. at 2; (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.185(15), 33.30.241 (Michie 2002)).
137. Id. at 3-4.
20031
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
sex offenders, and, as a result, they argued they are automati-
cally labeled "dangerous."138
The respondents claimed the law is an ex post facto law be-
cause the law is punitive, as it regulates the individual rather
than his or her participation in an activity.139 To determine
whether the law is ex post facto, the respondents applied the "in-
tent and effects" test used in Kansas v. Hendricks.140 Hendricks
requires the determination of legislative intent; however, if the
legislative intent cannot be determined, the court must analyze
whether the law is regulatory in both structure and design by
looking at its codification, procedural protections, triggering
events, and sanctions imposed.' When the purpose of the law
cannot be determined by examining the face of the statute or
when the law is a civil statute, the court must determine if the
nature of the law is "'so punitive either in purpose or effect' as 'to
transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a
criminal penalty. ' 4'  To make this determination, the respon-
dents argued that factors from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez'43
should be applied. 4 4 These factors include:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in re-
lation to the alternative purpose assigned.
145
138. Id. at 5 n.3.
139. Id. at 18.
140. 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997). The respondents concluded that the law is punitive on
its face because it is codified in the criminal code and not codified in the civil code. Brief
for Respondents at 25, Smith (No. 01-729). Thus, the respondents believed the law demon-
strates a punitive intent. Id.
141. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-63; see infra Part VI.C.
142. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ward,
448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956)) (rul-
ing that the government can impose sanctions to deter the specific activity of a person).
The respondents urged the statute is not regulatory because each sex offender must com-
ply with the notification and registration laws or be subject to criminal prosecution. Brief
for Respondents at 21, Smith (No. 01-729). Thus, the respondents concluded the law regu-
lates "the individual" because each sex offender must comply with the law merely because
he or she has been convicted of a sex crime. Id.
143. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
144. Brief for Respondents at 19, Smith (No. 01-729).
145. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
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According to the respondents, they merely had to demonstrate
that one or more of the Mendoza-Martinez factors make Alaska's
sex offender registration and community notification law exces-
sive in its purpose and effect.146
After applying the Mendoza-Martinez test, the respondents
concluded that the laws do not regulate the activity of sex offend-
ers but are punitive as they punish sex offenders for their previ-
ous convictions.'47 Furthermore, the respondents argued that the
statute unduly infringes on their privacy rights and retroactively
infringes on their rights because the statute applies to offenders
who committed crimes before the enactment of the statute.148
Like Connecticut Department of Public Safety, the Supreme
Court of the United States issued an opinion in this case on
March 5, 2003, and finally resolved whether sex offender regis-
tration and community notification laws violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution.1
49
VI. DID CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND
SMITH ALTER THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS?
A. The Inevitable Failure of the Procedural Due Process Claim in
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe 5 °
On March 5, 2003, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in
Connecticut Department of Public Safety, which appears to put
procedural due process challenges to sex offender registration and
community notification laws to death. 5' Unlike lower courts,'52
the Court did not analyze the validity of the claimants' due proc-
ess claim under the Paul v. Davis framework.'53 In fact, the Court
146. Brief for Respondents at 20, Smith (No. 01-729) (citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 250-51).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Smith v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1140 (2003). See discussion infra Part VI.C-D., which
contains a discussion of the Court's opinion and analyzes the impact of the decision on the
constitutionality of sex offender registration and community notification laws.
150. 123 S. Ct. 1160 (2003).
151. See id. at 1164-65.
152. See discussion infra Part V.B.
153. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 123 S. Ct. at 1164.
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determined that, even if sex offenders are deprived of a liberty in-
terest, they are not entitled to notice and a hearing because pro-
cedural due process does not mandate a person be afforded a
hearing to establish a fact that "is not material under the Con-
necticut statute."154 Accordingly, Connecticut's statute does not
violate procedural due process because the registration require-
ment hinges upon the sex offender's conviction alone-a convic-
tion the sex offender previously had the opportunity to contest at
trial.155 Connecticut's compulsory registration requirement man-
dates that a sex offender convicted of a particular crime register;
the risk the sex offender poses to the public does not impact a sex
offender's requirement to register under the Connecticut statute
because a sex offender must register under the statute regardless
of whether or not he or she is a current danger to society. 156
The Court also concluded the case presented a substantive due
process claim "'recast in 'procedural due process' terms."' 57 Thus,
the Court stated "[u]nless [the] respondent can show that the
substantive rule of law is defective (by conflicting with a provision
of the Constitution) any hearing on current dangerousness is a
bootless exercise."15 Since the claimant did not challenge the
Connecticut statute as a violation of substantive due process, the
Court left open the question as to whether such sex offender reg-
istration and community notification laws violate substantive due
process. 159
While the Court refused to analyze the case under Paul v.
Davis, Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, concluded that even if
the laws implicate a sex offender's liberty interest "the categorical
abrogation of the liberty interest by a validly enacted statute suf-
fices to provide all the process that is due-just as a state law
providing that no one under the age of 16 may operate a motor
vehicle suffices to abrogate that liberty interest." 60 Unless sex of-
fender registration and community notification laws infringe
upon a sex offender's substantive due process rights, the laws
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1164-65 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 308 (1993)).
158. Id. at 1164 (quoting Flores, 507 U.S. at 308).
159. Id. at 1165.
160. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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cannot be attacked in the context of due process. 161 Thus, a sex of-
fender does not have a right to establish that "he is not dangerous
[any more] than.., a 15-year-old boy has a right to process ena-
bling him to establish that he is a safe driver."
16 2
In addition, Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined
in a concurring opinion, reiterated that a sex offender may still
challenge sex offender registration and community notification
laws on substantive due process grounds.163 Furthermore, Justice
Souter suggested that sex offenders may challenge the validity of
sex offender registration and community notification laws, like
Connecticut's, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution.164 The Equal Protection
Clause provides that a state cannot "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.1 65 Justice Souter
held that, under Connecticut's statutory scheme, courts utilizing
their discretion may excuse a sex offender from registering if he
or she meets certain requirements and public safety does not ne-
cessitate that the information be released to law enforcement offi-
cials or the public. 66 Thus, Connecticut distinguishes between sex
offenders qualifying for an exemption from registration and noti-
fication requirements from those who are not, and "like all legis-
lative choices affecting individual rights, [is] open to challenge"
on equal protection grounds. 167
While Justice Stevens appended his concurrence to his dissent
in Smith v. Doe,'68 he stated that sex offender registration and
community notification laws do not violate procedural due process
unless the sex offender previously has not been afforded a trial
satisfying the Constitution. 69 Since none of the justices dissented
in Connecticut Department of Public Safety and the Court re-
sounded that the Connecticut sex offender registration and com-
munity notification laws do no violate sex offenders' procedural
due process rights, the Court seems to extinguish the validity of
161. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
162. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
163. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
164. Id. (Souter, J., concurring)
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
166. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 123 S. Ct. at 1165 (Souter, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 1166.
168. Smith v. Doe, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1156 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 1158 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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future procedural due process challenges to sex offender registra-
tion and community notification laws.
B. The Implications of Connecticut Department of Public Safety
on the Constitutionality and Future of Sex Offender
Registration and Community Notification Laws
While the Supreme Court made a case-specific inquiry into the
statutory scheme of Connecticut's sex offender registration and
community notification laws, the Supreme Court unanimously
(through the majority and concurring opinions) declared the inva-
lidity of procedural due process challenges to sex offender regis-
tration and community notification laws.17° Although the Court
analyzed the validity of a statute utilizing the compulsory classi-
fication system, any challenge to a statute using a discretionary
classification system will likely fail because the Court resounds
that all sex offenders have notice and an opportunity to be heard
during their trial.171 Furthermore, sex offenders receive an addi-
tional opportunity to be heard in states using discretionary classi-
fication systems.172
Lower courts must abandon the use of Paul v. Davis to analyze
any future procedural due process challenges to sex offender reg-
istration and community notification laws because the Court ex-
plicitly refused to apply the stigma plus test in Connecticut De-
partment of Public Safety. 7' As a result, lower courts will likely
find it impossible to conclude that such laws infringe upon sex of-
fenders' procedural due process rights-even if sex offender regis-
tration and community notification laws implicate an offender's
liberty interest, they are not entitled to notice and an opportunity
to be heard. 74 Under compulsory classification regimes, like Con-
necticut's, procedural due process does not mandate a person be
afforded a hearing to establish that he is not a threat to society
under such statutory schemes. 75
170. See supra Part VI.A.
171. See supra Part VI.A.
172. See supra Part III.
173. See supra Part VI.A.
174. See supra Part VI.A.
175. See supra Part VI.A.
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Any relief sought in the due process context must be asserted
under substantive due process. Since the respondents did not at-
tack the Connecticut statute on substantive due process grounds,
the Court refused to address the validity of these laws on this ba-
sis.176 However, as a result of this opinion and from the encour-
agement provided by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, the Court
will likely have the opportunity to analyze the constitutionality of
sex offender registration and community notification laws under
substantive due process. Furthermore, if sex offenders follow the
advice of Justices Souter and Ginsburg, they will also seek to
challenge sex offender registration and community notification
laws, especially laws like Connecticut's, on equal protection
grounds. Ultimately, opponents of sex offender registration and
community notification laws will continue to attack the constitu-
tionality of these laws; however, the Supreme Court recognized
the importance of these laws to the safety of every American and
will likely continue to validate such laws.
C. The Death of the Ex Post Facto Claim in Smith v. Doe 177
On the same day that the Supreme Court of the United States
handed down its decision in Connecticut Department of Public
Safety, the Court also issued an opinion in Smith v. Doe. The
Court ruled that sex offender registration and community notifi-
cation laws, which apply retroactively, do not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.1 7 8
Before analyzing the arguments of the case, the Court dictated
the framework for the ex post facto analysis. 79 First, the Court
must determine whether the legislative intent of the statute is
civil or punitive. 8 ° If the statute has a punitive purpose, the in-
quiry ends."8 ' If the statute implements a "regulatory scheme that
is civil and nonpunitive," the Court must examine the statute to
determine whether it is so punitive that it cannot be deemed
176. See supra Part VIA.
177. 123 S. Ct. 1140 (2003).
178. Id. at 1152.
179. Id. at 1146-47.
180. Id. (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)).
181. Id.
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civil.1 12 According to the Court, only the "clearest proof' may over-
ride the purported legislative intent and transform a civil remedy
into a punitive remedy."3 To accurately interpret the meaning of
the statute, the Court must examine the text and structure of the
statute. 184
The Court determined that the statute explicitly stated the leg-
islative intent-to protect the public from sex offender recidi-
vism.185 Accordingly, the Alaskan legislature believed the best
way to effectuate the purpose of the statute was to disseminate
the information to appropriate governmental agencies and the
public."8 6 The Supreme Court looked to Kansas v. Hendricks'
where it held that a statute imposing restrictive measures on sex
offenders determined to be dangerous is "a legitimate nonpunitive
governmental objective and has been historically so regarded."'
The Court found, as it did in Hendricks, that " [n] othing on the
face of the statute suggests that the legislature sought to create
anything other than a civil.., scheme designed to protect the
public from harm.""8 9 Applying precedent, the Court determined
even if the statute's objective was consistent with the purpose of
the criminal justice system, the state's pursuit of a regulatory
scheme did not make the statute punitive. 90
While the Court recognized that the codified location of a stat-
ute serves as a factor in determining whether the statute is puni-
tive, the location of the statute was not a determinative factor in
this case because the statute is codified in Alaska's "Health,
Safety, and Housing Code."' 9 ' However, the registration require-
ments are located in Alaska's criminal procedure code.' 92 Al-
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
188. Id. at 363.
189. Smith, 123 S. Ct. at 1147 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361). The Court also ex-
amined other precedents, including Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), where the
Court held that a federal law that retroactively terminated accrued social security benefits
of aliens who were members of the Communist Party was constitutional, as the purpose of
the law was not to punish but to condition receipt of benefits on residence in the United
States. Id. at 616-20.
190. Smith, 123 S. Ct. at 1148.
191. Id. at 1148.
192. Id.
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though the location of the statute may serve as a determinative
factor, it is not a dispositive factor and cannot transform a civil
remedy into a punitive remedy.1 93 Applying precedent, the Court
determined that the location of the registration statute in the
criminal procedure code did not automatically make the statute
punitive because Alaska's criminal procedure code contains provi-
sions which do not impose punishments, but have an administra-
tive purpose and cannot be deemed punitive.194
Next, the Court examined the statute's procedural mecha-
nisms."' The statute requires a court to notify a sex offender in
writing of the civil registration and notification requirements
when the sex offender enters a plea as well as at the time a court
renders a judgment against the offender.196 The Court determined
that alerting convicted offenders to the civil registration require-
ments and punishment for noncompliance does not render the
statute punitive, because courts regularly provide defendants
with notice of civil requirements and penalties for noncompliance
to facilitate compliance with the statute. 97 Here, as in many
statutes, notice is important because violators are subject to
criminal punishment.19 Finally, the statute only requires a sex
offender to register, and the Alaska Department of Public Safety,
which regularly enforces compliance with civil and criminal laws,
enforces the registration and community notification laws.'99
Thus, the statute has a civil intent and purpose.200
After determining the intent of the statute, the Court examined
the effect of the statute under the following Mendoza-Martinez
factors: "[wihether the sanction involves an affirmative disability
or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a pun-
ishment, . . . whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence,... whether an
193. Id. The Court examined United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
354 (1984), where the Court deemed a forfeiture to be civil even though the statute author-
izing forfeiture was part of the criminal code, and refused to allow the mere location of a
statute to be dispositive of the statute's intent because both civil and criminal cases can be
deemed punitive. Id. at 363-65.
194. Smith, 123 S. Ct. at 1148.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1149.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is as-
signable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned."2"1 The Court did not analyze
whether the statute only assists in a finding of scienter and
whether the statute only applies to acts already constituting
crimes.2 °2 Applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors, the Court de-
termined that sex offender registration and community notifica-
tion laws do not constitute punishment.20 3 While the laws stigma-
tize sex offenders, these individuals are not stigmatized as a
result of public punishment or ridicule but from the distribution
of accurate information obtained from their criminal record,
which consists primarily of public information. 24 Traditionally,
courts have not recognized the distribution of truthful informa-
tion as punitive.20 5 Unlike colonial punishments, where people
were forced to wear letters and shunned from participating in so-
ciety, sex offender registration and community notification laws
do not make stigmatization an integral objective of the statutory
scheme.20 6
Furthermore, Alaska's method of distributing registry informa-
tion on the Internet did not influence or alter the Court's deci-
sion.27 The Court concluded that broad dissemination of informa-
tion does not render the statute punitive because the purpose of
Alaska's statute is to distribute registry information to protect
public safety.208 Thus, broad access is necessary to effectuate the
statute's purpose, and stigmatization and humiliation are collat-
eral consequences because the information provided does not fa-
cilitate a means to shame the offenders by allowing the public to
post comments or appear in public.20 9 Furthermore, the Court
stated that the statute disseminates registry information via the
Internet because it is an efficient, convenient, and effective man-
ner to protect the public from sex offenders.210
201. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
202. See Smith, 123 S. Ct. at 1154.
203. See id. at 1150.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1150-51.
208. Id. at 1150.
209. Id. at 1151.
210. Id.
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Although the statute stigmatizes sex offenders, the statute
does not impose a punishment.211 Stigmatization results indi-
rectly from the statute because the statute does not prevent sex
offenders from obtaining employment, traveling, or choosing to
reside in a neighborhood.2 12 The Court rejected the argument that
the laws prevent sex offenders from obtaining employment or
housing because without the laws, landlords and employers may
use background checks to obtain an applicant's criminal record.21 3
Stigmatization and societal ostracism do not result from registra-
tion and notification laws, but from a sex offender's conviction-
which is a public record even without the enactment of registra-
tion and notification laws. 21 '4 Furthermore, the Court concluded
that forcing sex offenders to update registry information does not
constitute a disability and does not equate to parole or supervised
release because sex offenders may live and work freely like every
other citizen. 21 ' Although sex offenders must report changes in
their appearance, they do not have to seek permission to do so be-
fore making such changes, which further demonstrates their abil-
ity to live freely without governmental invasion on their pri-
vacy.216 Even though states like Alaska prosecute a sex offender
for failing to comply with registration and community notification
laws, prosecution for violating these laws constitutes an offense,
which is independent of the sex offender's original crime.217
While sex offender registration and community notification
laws may deter future crimes, deterrence does not automatically
deem a statute punitive because such a rule would undermine the
government's ability to create regulatory schemes. In addition,
the Court ruled that sex offender registration and community no-
tification laws are not retributive because, under Alaska's stat-
ute, reporting requirements are determined by the crime commit-
ted and not by the risk the individual sex offender poses.219
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1152.
217. Id.
218. Id. (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105 (1997)).
219. Id. The broad categories, which determine the length of reporting, distinguish be-
tween various crimes, but this distinction is justified because the distinctions are based on
the risk of recidivism, which is a reasonable governmental objective. Id.
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Furthermore, registration and notification requirements do not
constitute ex post facto laws because they refuse to make an indi-
vidual assessment of each sex offender's risk of recidivism.22 ° The
Court concluded that Alaska's sex offender registration and com-
munity notification laws are narrowly tailored to meet the Alas-
kan government's regulatory purpose.22'
Finally, the Court ruled that the length of time sex offenders
must report registry information is not excessive because most
sex offenders do not commit subsequent offenses during their first
few years after their release, but instead commit offenses years
after their release. 222 The Court held that the regulatory nature of
Alaska's statute did not constitute an ex post facto law because
the law reasonably related to the government's objective, which is
to protect the public and prevent recidivism.223 Since Alaska's sex
offender registration and community notification statute, like
other states' registration and notification laws, is regulatory and
not punitive, the retroactive application of the statute does not of-
fend the Ex Post Facto Clause.224
While Justice Thomas concurred in judgment, he wrote a sepa-
rate concurrence to express disfavor with the Court's analysis of
the constitutionality of disclosing registry information via the
Internet.2 1 Since the statute does not specify the means of dis-
seminating registration, Justice Thomas concluded the Court
"strayed from the statute."226 Thus, Justice Thomas determined
that the Court should not have analyzed the constitutionality of
distributing registry information via the Internet because the
Court's ex post facto analysis should be limited to the statutory
requirements.227
Like Justice Thomas, Justice Souter concurred in judgment,
but wrote a concurrence to explain how he thought the statute
should be analyzed.22 Instead of requiring the clearest proof to
overturn the legislature's purported purpose, Justice Souter did
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. Id. at 1153.
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1154 (Thomas, J., concurring).
226. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
227. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 1155 (Souter, J., concurring).
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not believe the heightened burden applied to cases where "legisla-
tive intent clearly points in the civil direction." 229 Justice Souter
felt the clearest proof standard did not apply because of the legis-
lative intent of the statute. Furthermore, Justice Souter con-
cluded that Alaska's sex offender registration and community no-
tification laws did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because
the Court deferentially presumes that state laws are constitu-
tional.23 °
Justice Stevens dissented in this case, but combined his con-
currence in Connecticut Department of Public Safety with his
opinion in Smith.23' In both cases, Justice Stevens believed the
Court should have determined whether sex offender registration
and community notification laws implicate a sex offender's liberty
interest.232 Justice Stevens concluded that Alaska's statute im-
poses registration requirements equivalent to those imposed on
parolees and persons subject to supervised release.233 As a result,
Justice Stevens believed the laws implicate a liberty interest be-
cause a sex offender must register for an extended period of time,
must report changes in his or her residence and appearance, and
must bear a lifetime of stigmatization.234 Justice Stevens con-
cluded the laws are punitive, instead of civil, because they de-
prive a sex offender of his liberty interest, are applicable to every
person convicted of an enumerated sex crime, and only are im-
posed on criminals. 235 Furthermore, Justice Stevens determined
that the mere fact the legislature implemented the laws to com-
bat recidivism coupled with the retroactive application of the
laws, renders the laws ex post facto. 236 However, Justice Stevens
concluded that a sex offender registration and community notifi-
cation statute is constitutional if it applies to sex offenders con-
victed after the enactment of the statute because the statute pro-
vides adequate notice and constitutes a traditional form of
punishment-in the context of retribution and deterrence.237
229. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 1156 (Souter, J., concurring).
231. Id. at 1156 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 1157 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
233. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
234. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 1158 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Breyer joined Justice Ginsburg in her dissent.238 Justice
Ginsburg believed the clearest proof standard should not be ap-
plied to Smith.239 When analyzing the statute, Justice Ginsburg
applied the Mendoza-Martinez factors to evaluate the statute's
purpose and effects.24° She concluded the law has a punitive effect
because it imposes "onerous and intrusive" registration require-
ments on sex offenders and exposes sex offenders to humiliation
and ostracism.241 Justice Ginsburg equated the punishment im-
posed by registration and notification laws to the colonial pun-
ishments of shaming and shunning because she felt the laws re-
semble requirements imposed on persons subject to parole and
supervised release.242 Unlike the majority, Justice Ginsburg
thought that past crimes, not an individual's current dangerous-
ness, trigger the implementation of the statute, which does not
further the purported purpose 'of the statute-deterrence of fu-
ture crimes. Justice Ginsburg concluded that the punitive ef-
fects of the statute overshadow any regulatory purpose because
sex offenders must register as the result of their conviction of a
particular crime and not because they pose a current or future
danger to society.244 Finally, Justice Ginsburg determined that
Alaska's statute was ambiguous as to its intent and punitive as to
its effect. 245 Thus, Justice Ginsburg found that the law consti-
tuted an ex post facto law.246
D. The Impact of Smith v. Doe on the Constitutionality and
Future of Sex Offender Registration and Community
Notification Laws
Although the Supreme Court did not issue a unanimous deci-
sion, the Court's opinion clearly dictates that sex offender regis-
tration and community notification laws do not constitute ex post
facto laws even if they apply retroactively and are implemented
238. Id. at 1159-60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 1159 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
240. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
241. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
242. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 1160 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
244. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
245. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
246. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1274
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
by a state using a compulsory classification system to determine
which sex offenders are subject to registration and notification.247
Clearly, the Court recognized the important role these laws play
in promoting public safety and preventing recidivism. Further-
more, the Court validated the regulatory purpose of sex offender
registration and community notification laws and acknowledged
that these laws are not implemented to punish sex offenders for
their prior crimes, but to protect the public and deter future
248crimes. While the laws will hopefully deter future sex crimes,
the Supreme Court determined that the deterrent effect of regis-
tration and notification laws does not deem them ex post facto or
unconstitutional.249
Potential sex offenders and convicted sex offenders should heed
the warning that they will be subject to registration and notifica-
tion laws if they commit a crime, and their crimes will cause them
to be stigmatized and possibly ostracized from their community.
However, this stigmatization and ostracism does not prevent
them from living, marrying, traveling, raising a family, and ac-
quiring an education-rights many victims of sexual crimes
lose.25 Rather, sex offenders enjoy the same rights of all other
American citizens. Finally, the laws do not ostracize sex offend-
ers, but sex offenders' stigmatization arises from their voluntary
engagement in sexually deviant conduct-conduct they can pre-
vent.251
Since the laws distribute accurate, truthful, and public infor-
mation about sex offenders, they cannot be deemed punitive. The
Court's determination that the laws do not exhibit a punitive in-
tent or effect will likely impact any defamation claims asserted by
sex offenders. Furthermore, since the Court determined that the
notification laws merely disclose public information that is
largely available through background checks and criminal re-
cords, any claims that such laws infringe on one's right to privacy
will continue to face an uphill battle.
Not only did the Court validate the laws under the Ex Post
Facto Clause, but the Court also ratified the dissemination of sex
247. See supra Part VI.C.
248. See supra Part VI.C.
249. See supra Part VI.C.
250. See supra Part VI.C.
251. See supra Part VI.C.
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offender information via the Internet.252 Since the Internet is the
most efficient means to distribute the information to the largest
audience, other methods of distributing sex offender information,
such as by newspaper or allowing citizens to examine registration
records at the police station, must also be considered constitu-
tional as well.
Both of these opinions further the belief that states are free to
create their own sex offender registration and community notifi-
cation laws as long as they comply with the federal statutory
scheme. States may implement statutes using compulsory and
discretionary classification systems and laws applying retroac-
tively without violating procedural due process or the Ex Post
Facto Clause. When faced with constitutional challenges to sex
offender registration and community notification laws, the Su-
preme Court will be forced to continue to make a case specific in-
quiry into a state's law unless a mandatory federal statutory
scheme emerges, which is very unlikely. Thus, state sex offender
registration and community laws will continue to vary with re-
gard to persons required to register, the length of time a sex of-
fender is subject to registration, the means used to disclose regis-
try information, and the content of the information disclosed.
VII. CONCLUSION
Due to public sentiment and the importance of protecting chil-
dren from sexual predators, sex offender registration and com-
munity notification laws will continue to play an important role
in American society. While sex offender registration and commu-
nity notification laws do not provide a per se guarantee that sex
offenders will not commit subsequent sexual crimes, they in-
crease public awareness by allowing citizens to watch for poten-
tial threats to the safety of their family and friends. 3 Sex of-
fender registration and community notification laws allow
citizens and law enforcement to join in fighting sexual devi-
ance.
254
252. See supra Part VI.C.
253. See supra Part IV.
254. See supra Part IV.
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Since the inception of sex offender registration and community
notification laws, these laws have overcome numerous constitu-
tional challenges.2" The Supreme Court of the United States
unanimously held that sex offender registration and community
notification laws do not violate a sex offender's procedural due
process rights, and the Court also held that such laws do not con-
stitute ex post facto laws.2" 6 However, the Supreme Court left
open the question of whether sex offender registration and com-
munity notification laws infringe on a sex offender's substantive
due process rights and equal protection rights.257 Thus, lower
courts will attempt to resolve substantive due process and emerg-
ing equal protection challenges.258 If the Supreme Court plays a
more active role in defining the constitutionality of sex offender
registration and community notification laws, these laws may
have uniformity throughout the nation. The methods of classify-
ing sex offenders and the persons subject to registration may
change; however, sex offender registration and community notifi-
cation laws will survive. While constitutional challenges inevita-
bly remain, the Supreme Court will likely continue to validate the
constitutionality of sex offender registration and community noti-
fication laws.
Like many laws, sex offender registration and community noti-
fication laws impose registration and notification requirements,
but these ministerial burdens imposed on sex offenders are nec-
essary to protect the public from sexual predators.259 Sex offend-
ers forfeit their privacy rights when they infringe on the rights of
others by committing heinous sexual crimes. While sex offender
registration and community notification laws may disclose infor-
mation that might otherwise be less accessible, the disclosure of
such information is required to inform the public of dangerous
persons in the community.26 ° Ultimately, all laws infringe upon
the "freedom" of every American citizen in some manner. How-
ever, sex offender registration and community notification laws
do not serve to punish but to protect all American citizens. Al-
though sex offender registration and community notification laws
255. See supra Part V.
256. See supra Parts VI.A., C.
257. See supra Part VI.A.
258. See supra Part VI.A.
259. See supra Part IV.
260. See supra Part IV.
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may cause sex offenders to have a negative reputation in the
community, these laws do not infringe upon a sex offender's right
to live, work, and travel-rights sex offenders have denied many
of their victims.
26 1
Kimberly B. Wilkins
261. See supra Part VI.
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